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Abstract
In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes.
This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies.
A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way:
while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show
that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more
and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with
4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average
quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems
that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.
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1 Introduction
Imitation, in some strategic settings, has been shown to have negative side eﬀects for
the players involved. Specifically, in oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor
yields very competitive outcomes and correspondingly low profits. This has been pre-
dicted theoretically by Vega-Redondo (1997) and confirmed experimentally by a number
of studies (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 1999; Oﬀerman, Potters, and Sonnemans, 2002;
Apesteguia, Huck, and Oechssler 2007; Apesteguia, Huck, Oechssler, and Weidenholzer,
2010; Bigoni and Fort, 2013). A recent paper by Friedman, Huck, Oprea, and Weiden-
holzer (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very
competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer
time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes.
Friedman et al. (2015) show this result for long-horizon duopolies and triopolies. Huck,
Normann, and Oechssler (2004) review results from a large number of short-horizon ex-
periments and conclude that 4 firms are usually suﬃcient to prevent tacit collusion. An
interesting question, then, is whether collusive outcomes come about in long-horizon mar-
kets with more than 3 firms. Furthermore, given the novelty of the long-horizon result, it
is important to test its robustness.
This paper seeks to address these issues by looking at long-horizon markets with 2 and
4 firms, using linear demand curves. We succeed in replicating Friedman et al.’s (2015)
result that duopolies eventually became fairly collusive. However, while we also replicate
a downward trend in quantities for 4 firms, none of our 4 firm oligopolies becomes perma-
nently collusive. The average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many,” even with 1200 periods, in the sense
that collusion is very diﬃcult to achieve.
2 Experimental design
Our experimental design was based on the one by Friedman et al. (2015). In order to
allow for a replication, several key elements of their environment were maintained. Like
in their experiment, the total number of periods was 1200, the length of each period was
4 seconds, the computer interface very closely resembled theirs, and subjects received the
same feedback information. However, we used a Cournot market with linear demand
and cost functions, in contrast to Friedman et al. (2015) who used a unit elastic demand
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function. We did this for two reasons. First, we wanted to make our experiment comparable
to the bulk of the literature, which uses linear demand and cost functions (see e.g. Huck
et al. 1999, Apesteguia, Huck, and Oechssler 2007; and Apesteguia, Huck, Oechssler,
and Weidenholzer, 2010). Second, due to the profit functions used in Friedman et al.
(2015), two of their benchmark cases (the joint profit maximizing output and the perfectly
competitive Walrasian outcome) are on the boundary of the strategy space, which could
have an eﬀect. Replicating their duopoly treatment with a more standard profit function
can thus be valuable.
A further diﬀerence between their design and ours is that we do not rematch firms after
400 periods. However, letting subjects interact in fixed groups for 1200 periods should make
collusion more likely.
Finally, we extend their experiment by studying a market with 4 firms. Depending on
the treatment, we had either 2 or 4 symmetric firms in each market. Quantities could be
chosen with a slider almost continuously between 0 and 100.1 The demand side of the
market was modelled with the computer buying all supplied units according to the inverse
demand function
 = max{100− 0} (1)
with  = P∈  denoting total quantity in period  and  the set of firms. The cost
function for each seller was simply () =   Hence, profits were  = ( − 1) 
In the stage game, the following benchmarks can be derived (see Table 1). In the 4-
firm treatment with  = {1 2 3 4} the unique Cournot Nash equilibrium (CNE) is given
by  = 198 i ∈ . The corresponding price is  = 208. The symmetric joint
profit maximizing (JPM) output is given by  = 12375 i ∈  resulting in a price of
 = 505. Finally, the perfect competitive Walrasian outcome, in the following PCW,
is signified by  = 2475 i ∈  and a price of  = 1.
The duopoly with  = {1 2} yields following predictions. The price in the case of the
CNE is  = 34 resulting from  = 33 i ∈ . JPM is given by  = 2475 i ∈ 
and a price of  = 505. Finally the PCW is signified by  = 495 i ∈  and
 = 1.
Like in Friedman et al. (2015) subjects were not told the profit function in order to
generate a low information environment. Subjects were only told that they represented
1The step size of the slider was 0.016.
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Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks
2-firms 4-firms
       
PCW 495 99 1 0 2475 99 1 0
CNE 33 66 34 1089 198 792 208 39204
JPM 2475 495 505 122513 12375 495 505 61256
firms and that the market price was decreasing in total quantity. Furthermore they were
told that the profit depended only on the current period’s quantity decisions of the subjects
in their group and that the profit function did not change across time.2
After making his or her decision in each period, each subjects had access to information
about his or her total earnings, the current period, the number of periods remaining, the
amount of time left in the current period (in the form of a progress bar), and information
related to the quantities chosen and the profits earned by all subjects in his or her group
in the previous period. The information about the previous period was presented on a
2-dimensional plot (see the appendix), which again closely resembled the clever display
used by Friedman et al. (2015). Quantity and profit pairs were plotted with quantity
on the  axis and profit on the  axis. This allowed subjects to quickly identify the
quantities and profits of other players and themselves (players were color coded to help
with diﬀerentiation). Subjects could choose a quantity for the current period by clicking
anywhere on the plot. When clicking, the  value of the cursor location would be updated
as the current quantity choice. An empty box along the  axis was used to show this current
choice. This choice could be updated as often as desired until the end of the period.
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).3 In order to
squeeze so many periods into a short time, periods only lasted 4 seconds each. In order
to implement such short periods, a pseudo-real-time experiment was used.4 The specific
functionality allowed subjects to select a quantity using a slider at any time. Every 4 sec-
2The Instructions subjects received are shown in the Appendix.
3The fact that z-Tree can be used to run experiments in almost continuous time has also be used by
Bigoni et al. (2015).
4The z-Tree program utilizes the “later() repeat { } ” command with  being a fraction of a second.
Each iteration counts down the time left in the period. When the countdown finishes, current quantities
and profits for each firm are recorded and reported to the group. Individual quantities can be updated at
any time during the countdown or can be left at the previous period’s level. Other firms’ changes are only
reported at the end of each period.
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onds, the current quantities for each subject were recorded to determine a 1-period payoﬀ,
and this information (quantities and payoﬀs for each subject) was communicated to each
player. Quantity changes within the 4-second window did not take eﬀect and were not
communicated to other subjects until the beginning of the next 4-second window. To allow
subjects to familiarize themselves with the software, the first period lasted 10 seconds.
The experiments were conducted in the experimental lab of the economics department
of the University of Heidelberg. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in the lab such that they could
not infer with whom they would interact in a fixed group. In the 2-firm treatment there was
1 session of 12 subjects, for a total of 6 observations (1 pair = 1 statistically independent
observation). In the 4-firm treatment there were 2 sessions of 8 and 16 subjects, for a
total of 24 subjects and 6 observations (1 group of 4 subjects = 1 observation). Subjects
participated in a single, 1200-period, Cournot oligopoly market in a session. Profits where
denominated in ‘Taler’, the exchange rate for euro () (70000:1 in the 2-firm treatment,
20000:1 in the 4-firm treatment) was known. The average payoﬀ was about 17.70 .5
Experiments lasted less than 120 minutes including instruction time. Instructions (see
Appendix A) were written on paper and distributed at the beginning of each session.
3 Results
Like Friedman et al. (2015) we first consider the initial 25 periods (see Figure 1).6 As in
their experiment, and in most of the existing literature, median total quantities are very
competitive and clearly above the Nash equilibrium quantity (CNE). This holds for both
the 2-firm and the 4-firm treatment, although the quantities in the 4-firm treatment are
even more competitive.
Next, we turn to the evolution of median total quantities over all 1200 periods (see
Figure 2; see also Table 2 for mean quantities, prices, and profits). The left panel of Figure
2 shows the median quantities in the 2-firm treatment. Median quantities decrease over
time, just as those observed in Friedman et al. (2015). After 400 periods, median quantities
are persistently between the CNE and the collusive JPM output. This indicates that the
results of Friedman et al. (2015) are robust to the specific functional form of the demand
and cost functions, since we can replicate their results with more standard functional forms.
5We added a show-up fee of 10 after the earnings in the first session were unexpectedly low.
6We use median quantities in the figures because Friedman et al. (2015) do so as well. The appendix
contains the corresponding figures with mean quantities.
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Figure 1: Median quantities over the first 25 periods
Note: Medians are calculated for each period over all 6 markets.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the median quantities in the 4-firm treatment. As
in Friedman et al. (2015, Figure 3) we observe a clear downward trend in quantities.
However, in contrast to their study, the downward trend in our experiment comes to a halt
after around 600 periods.7 More importantly, median quantities stay above the CNE. On
the aggregate, there are no collusive tendencies in markets with 4 firms.
Indeed, looking at individual 4-firm market medians (see Figure 3) we see that not one
of the median quantities reaches the JPM permanently. Only one market (market 3) comes
close at around period 800 but returns later to the CNE. While the JPM was not attained
in any of the 4-firm markets, there seem to be cases of both the CNE and PCW. Markets
7Simple OLS regressions of total quantity on period show no significant time trend for   600 while
there is a highly significant (  001) time trend for  ≤ 600
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Figure 2: Median quantities over all periods, plotted in bins of 25 periods
Note: Medians are calculated for each bin over all 6 markets and periods in the bin.
Table 2: Mean quantities, prices, and profits
2-firms 4-firms
periods      
1-50 37.24 28.20 728.51 29.05 8.82 112.06
1-400 34.76 31.61 884.76 25.56 7.72 123.16
401-800 29.52 41.25 1098.26 22.75 11.86 204.67
801-1200 29.29 41.45 1134.60 22.24 12.35 221.79
1151-1200 30.88 38.40 1098.99 21.69 13.76 258.02
1-1200 31.19 38.11 1039.21 23.51 10.64 183.00
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Graphs by market
Figure 3: Median total output for the 6 individual markets in treatment 4-firms: Only
market 3 ever comes close to the JPM
1, 2, and 5 never actually reach the CNE, and instead hover near the PCW, while firms
in markets 3, 4, and 6 reach total output near the CNE for at least some periods. That
said, of the markets that reached CNE levels of output, only market 4 seems to have spent
much time there. Markets 3 and 6 were much more volatile.
This bimodality seen in the 4-firm markets can also be seen in the individual 2-firm
medians (see Figure 4). While in the 4-firm markets we saw either the PCW or CNE,
2-firm markets tend toward either the CNE or the JPM. Markets 1, 2, and 6 were able to
sustain the JPM, while markets 3, 4, and 5 settled near the CNE.
In both treatments, then, it seems that the individual market medians are distributed
bimodally and, further, the 6-market median total output (from Figure 2) is rarely observed
in any particular market. It seems instead that the PCW, CNE, and JPM are somewhat
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Graphs by market
Figure 4: Median total output for the 6 individual markets in treatment 2-firms
focal, and that the diﬀerence in treatments can largely be attributed to the number of
markets drawn to each focal quantity. Mean figures in the appendix give further evidence
of this bimodality.
4 Conclusion
Our experiment explores the robustness of the main result of Friedman et al. (2015). In
Cournot duopoly markets, we confirm the presence of high levels of collusion after 1200
periods. However, when moving to markets with 4 firms, we find little diﬀerence from the
existing literature. As predicted by theories of imitation, markets with 4 firms remain more
competitive than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium even with 1200 periods. Our results, when
added to those for 3-firm oligopolies in Friedman et al. (2015), suggest that the eﬀect of
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increasing the number of periods quickly diminishes for markets with more firms.
In both our treatments we further find evidence of focality for certain market quantities.
The majority of our individual markets stabilized at quantities associated with the PCW,
CNE, or JPM. Since subjects were not made aware of the profit function, this result is that
much more striking.
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Appendix (for online publication only)
A Instructions
[English translation of the German instructions, 4-firm treatment. 2-firm treatment was
modified in the obvious way.]
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully.
Turn oﬀ your mobile phone, don’t talk to your neighbors, and remain quiet throughout
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and someone will come
over.
You will receive your payoﬀ individually and privately right at the end of the experi-
ment.
The experiment’s payoﬀs will be calculated in Taler (T). At the end of the experiment
your payoﬀs will be converted into euros, with 20,000 T = 1 euro.
The first experiment comprises 1200 periods, each of them lasting 4 seconds. Only the
first period is diﬀerent, as it lasts 10 seconds.
During the whole experiment you will be interacting with three participants in this
room. These three participants will remain the same over all 1200 periods. No one will
learn as to who interacted with whom.
Each of you represents a firm that produces and sells a product. So there are, in
addition to you, three competitors who produce and sell the same product.
During each of the 1200 periods you can decide what quantity of your product you
want to produce. The higher the total quantity of the product oﬀered on the market, the
lower the market price.
Although you have no precise information on the profits’ structure, the following im-
portant rules apply:
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• Your profit in each period exclusively depends on your decision and on the com-
petitors‘ decisions in the current period.
• The profit function will not change over time. If your and your competitors’
decision in a given period is the same as in the previous period, all companies will make
the same profit as in the previous period.
At the end all profits realized during the periods will be added up and paid out.
Starting from the second period you will receive the following information in each
period:
Your own quantity and the resulting profit of the previous period as well as the com-
petitors’ quantities and profits will be shown in following figure.
[here a figure like Figure 5 was displayed]
In the upper left corner you will be shown the number of remaining periods, the quantity
you selected in the previous period, and the resulting profit.
Below this information you have a time indicator. The green bar indicates your time
remaining in the current period for selecting a quantity. The more time has passed, the
shorter the bar.
Your quantity/profit combination will be indicated by a red dot. Your competitors’
combinations will be displayed in diﬀerent colors as shown in the upper right corner.
To select a quantity, click on the screen. The slider on the x-axis shows the decision
you have made. You are free to change your decision during a period.
Unless you choose a diﬀerent quantity for a period, the same quantity as in the previous
period will be produced.
To be sure, everything described above applies to the three other firms as well. All four
of you are reading exactly the same instruction.
Have fun!
B Additional figures
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own firm other firms
remaining periods
previous quantity
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time
Figure 5: z-tree Interface. By clicking anywhere on the plot, subjects could choose a
quantity for the current period. When clicking, the  value of the cursor location was
updated as the current quantity choice. The y-axis displayed profits for all firms
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Figure 6: Mean quantities over the first 25 periods
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Figure 7: Mean quantities over all periods, plotted in bins of 25 periods
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Figure 8: Mean total output for the 6 individual markets in treatment 4-firms: Only market
3 ever comes close to the JPM
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Figure 9: Mean total output for the 6 individual markets in treatment 2-firms
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